rd person judge): (6) watasi/*John-ni-wa kono keeki-wa oishii I/ John-DAT-TOP this cake-TOP tasty 'This cake is tasty to me / to John' Arguably, the direct experience requirement would be naturally explained if the judge is treated as an (experiencer) argument of the PPT predicate, which has its own idiosyncratic selectional restrictions. I will argue instead that judge-dependence of positive dimensional adjectives is more clearly seen from a relativist perspective. First, POS, unlike PPTs, doesn't take judge for-phrases (3b) (the only option being a sentence-initial for-phrase separated by a comma intonation: For someone like me, this bag is heavy). Moreover, the direct experience requirement does not hold for a POS judge, illustrated here with Japanese: (8) watasi/John-ni-wa kono kaban-wa omoi I/John-DAT-TOP this bag-TOP heavy 'For me / For John, this bag is heavy' Other judge-dependent degree constructions. We saw above that comparative DAs are not judgedependent. It is not generally the case, however, that degree constructions based on DAs are 'objective'. In particular, it turns out that DA-based constructions involving a root 'normative' modality (which is known to be judge-dependent) are subjective. Examples of this are: too-construction, as in This book is too long (see Meier 2003 , von Stechow et al. 2004 for a modal analysis), 'functional standard' construction, as in This book is a bit long for a 3-yo (Kagan and Alexejenko 2010; Bylinina 2011), and 'nominal attributive-with-infinitive' construction (nominal AIC), as in This is a long book to assign (Fleisher 2011) . All these are judge-dependent, as seen from their ability to give rise to faultless disagreement, exocentric uses, and embeddability under find (we use the find-test again for illustration): (9) a. Mary finds this car {too / a bit} expensive to buy now. 'TOO' / FUNCTIONAL STANDARD b. Mary finds 'Middlemarch' a long book to assign.
NOMINAL AIC What these constructions have in common is root 'normative' modality, which is known to be judgedependent, see (Saebo 2009) for an example of an entry for ought with a judge as an argument:
(ϕ) (= Saebo 2009: (54)) I will show that judge-dependence of modal degree constructions is different from that of PPTs in exactly the same ways as POS is different from PPTs -judge for-phrases are only sentence-initial (I will argue that sentence-internal for-phrases in these constructions should be analyzed as subjects of the infinitival clause) and the direct sensory experience requirement does not hold (the Japanese 1 st person constraint does not hold in these constructions). Again, this points to a direction of an analysis of 'normative' judgedependence which would be different from PPTs -namely, the relativist analysis. I propose that all the cases of non-PPT judge-dependence that I have discussed boil down to normative (or bouletic) modality. Judge-dependent positive forms of DAs get interpreted with respect to a modal standard.
I take the semantics for a positive morpheme as developed in (Kennedy 2007): (11) ⟦POS⟧ = λC <et> λP <ed> λx e . P(x) !> norm(P)(C) C = comparison class, !> = significantly exceed Norm is thus a function that takes a measure function and a comparison class set as its arguments, and gives a degree as its output: (12) ⟦norm⟧ = λC <et> λP <ed> . norm(P)(C) I suggest that a modal norm differs from the extensional one in that it takes modal counterparts of the members of the comparison class into consideration when defining the standard degree. The (contextually salient) proposition p restricts the set of worlds to consider. What this proposition would be is a matter of what the context is like (from the most general 'good states of affairs' from the speaker's perspective -to the particular purposes or wishes in mind): (13)
The modal in question is relativistically judge-dependent, in contrast to a PPT, which is contextually judge-dependent. This difference accounts for the puzzling data in (3). Finally, I address the slight contrast reported in Kennedy (2010) between PPTs under find (perfectly acceptable) and positive forms of gradable adjectives (slightly degraded): (14) a. Anna finds her bowl of pasta tasty/delicious/disgusting. b. ??Anna finds her bowl of pasta big/large/small/cold. Taking this contrast seriously leads to the following hypothesis: in order to appear in subjective contexts, POS needs to undergo a 'modal shift' to get interpreted with respect to a modal standard, which is a costly operation that results in decrease of acceptability.
